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The Anxiety of the Human Animal: Martin Luther on Non-human Animals and 
Human Animality 
 
 
‘But why should I speak at all of irrational animals?’ Luther asks after musing on why 
human beings alone are tormented by death in commenting on Psalm 90.
1
 The 
rhetorical question presupposes no adequate response, but despite this Luther speaks 
of animals almost everywhere in his writings. He thanks God for providing them for 
human use, defines what it means to be human in relation to them, illustrates 
theological arguments using them, finds allegorical messages in biblical texts 
concerning them and very frequently insults his enemies with reference to them. 
Notwithstanding the frequency of their appearance, references of this kind have led 
commentators to judge that Luther has little interest in non-human animals: Colin 
Gunton, for instance, concludes ‘Luther is not very interested in the non-personal 
world for its own sake’.
2
 At other points, however, Luther shows an anxious 
recognizes all that other animals have in common with human beings, proclaims the 
intimacy of God to them, holds them up as moral exemplars, is attentive to the detail 
of their lives, protests on their behalf against mistreatment and in one notable 
encounter takes the role of proto-hunt-saboteur in hiding a rabbit from hounds — 
although, to his regret, his attempt at protection is not finally successful. In this 
chapter, I will argue that Luther is both more various and less consistent in his 
consideration of animals than has previously been recognized, but that this 
inconsistency is a virtuous one. His vivid appreciation of the non- 
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1 Martin Luther, Luther’s Works, ed. Jaroslav Pelikan (Saint Louis: Concordia, 1958), vol. 13, p. 112. 
References to this English translation of his collected works are hereafter abbreviated in the form LW 
volume number.page number (e.g. for this case LW 13.112). 
2
 Colin Gunton, The Doctrine of Creation: Essays in Dogmatics, History and Philosophy (London: T & 
T Clark, 2004), 72n. 
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human animals he encounters means that in his account they break the fences within 
which he sometimes tries to restrain them and thereby indicate their need for a 
theological space more adequate to their place in God’s purposes. 
1. Human superiority and dominance over other animals 
For the most part, Luther is resolutely anthropocentric in his view of God’s purposes 
in creation. In his lectures on Genesis, he states that he focuses on God’s solicitude 
and benevolence towards us ‘because He provided such an attractive dwelling place 
for the future human being before the human being was created’.
3
 When human 
beings finally arrive on the scene they find ‘a ready and equipped home’ and they are 
commanded by God to ‘enjoy all the riches of so splendid a home’ progressively 
fitted out on each day of creation.
4
 Creation is a lesson in God’s providence; it 
‘plainly teaches that God created all these things in order to prepare a house and an 
inn, as it were, for the future man’.
5
 When God rests from the work of creation, it is 
because the home is finished and the ruler installed.
6
 Luther’s doctrine of the fall also 
indicates the human-centredness of creation: thorns, thistles, vermin, flies, toads and 
butterflies — butterflies? — and the savagery of wild animals were part of the 
punishment for human sin.
7
 In the flood, other animals and plants perished because of 
the sin of their ruler, just as human subjects often suffer on account of the errors of 
their leaders.
8
 
                                                 
3 Martin Luther, Lectures on Genesis, Chapters 1–5, LW 1.39. 
4
 LW 1.39. Luther follows a well-worn path at this point: Philo of Alexandria advances a very similar 
view in his commentary on Genesis (Philo, De opificio mundi in  Philo I, Loeb Classical Library, trans. 
F. H. Colson and G. H. Whitaker (London: Heinemann, 1929), §§ 25–28. This continuity is also 
evident at other points in Luther’s doctrine of creation. 
5
 LW 1.47. 
6
 LW 1.73. 
7
 LW 1.38, 1.54, 1.73. 
8 LW 1.183. The idea is repeated later in the Genesis commentary: the ‘use and ministry of creatures’ 
should not be despised because ‘God has created them to serve us’ (LW 6.24–5), and also features in 
other parts of Luther’s writings, e.g. God created everything else before human beings so as to lay up 
for us ‘at all times a sufficient store of food and clothing’ (45.48); ‘The Father gives himself to us, with 
heaven and earth and all the creatures, in order that they may serve us and benefit us’ (37.366); John 
the evangelist ‘dismisses all brute beasts, which did not fall and sin, and concentrates his attention on 
human nature, for the sake of which everything was made and created’ (22.29). Luther repeatedly 
interprets the creedal affirmation of God as creator to mean God makes everything to provide human 
comforts and necessities (Luther, ‘The Large Catechism’, in Theodore G. Tappert (ed.), The Book of 
Concord: The Confessions of the Evangelical Lutheran Church (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1959), 
2.13–14. Cf. ‘The Small Catechism’, in Tappert, The Book of Concord, II.2; ‘Ten Sermons on the 
Catechism’, LW 51.163), although he follows this passage in the ‘Large Catechism’ with a protest 
against their misuse (‘Large Catechism’, 2.21). The harshness of the consequences of God’s judgement 
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 Beyond this anthropocentric view of God’s purpose in creating non-human 
animals, Luther also seeks to affirm the superior characteristics of humans in 
comparison to other animals. For him this was especially clear before the fall. While 
Adam still bore the image of God, which Luther believes was lost in the fall, he was 
‘something far more distinguished and excellent’, in ways well beyond the moral and 
religious, surpassing all other creations in every respect: 
I am fully convinced that before Adam’s sin his eyes were so sharp and clear 
that they surpassed those of the lynx and eagle. He was stronger than the lions 
and the bears, whose strength is very great; and he handled them the way we 
handle puppies.
9
 
Adam also had ‘a perfect knowledge of the nature of the animals, the herbs, the fruits, 
the trees, and the remaining creatures’.
10
 After the fall all is changed. Death has ‘crept 
like leprosy into all our perceptive powers, so that with our intellect we cannot even 
understand that image’,
11
 which has been ‘almost completely lost’.
12
 Whereas before 
the fall Adam had ‘a greater strength and keener senses than the rest of the living 
beings, now human beings are greatly ‘surpassed by the boars in their sense of 
hearing, by the eagles in their sense of sight, and by the lion in his strength’.
13
 Before 
the fall, the difference between humans and other animals was therefore ‘far greater 
and more evident’, but even in the post-fall state Luther argues that ‘there is still a 
great difference between the human being and the rest of the animals’.
14
 He cites 
Lombard’s Sentences as authority for the view that human beings are the image of 
God, whereas the rest of the animals are only ‘footprints’ and human beings are 
appropriately  
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for non-human animals could be seen as linked to Luther’s theology of the cross requiring the 
annihilation of the natural, but Gregersen makes a convincing argument that this annihilation should 
not be understood as going beyond human sin (Niels Hendrik Gregersen, ‘The Cross of Christ in an 
Evolutionary World’, Dialog: A Journal of Theology 40:3 (2001), 197). 
9
 LW 1.62. 
10 LW 1.63. 
11
 LW 1.62. 
12
 LW 1.67. 
13
 LW 1.62. 
14 LW 1.67. 
 4
called a ‘world in miniature’.
15
 Luther also cites arguments beyond the text indicating 
the difference between humans and other species. In commenting on the creation of 
the heavenly bodies, he observes that pigs, cows and dogs cannot even measure the 
water they drink, whereas human beings measure the heavens using the ‘divinely 
revealed’ mathematical disciplines showing their heavenly destiny.
16
 Luther also 
repeats the argument of classical authors that ‘[man’s] very posture and physique 
strongly indicate that he belongs to the heavenly things despite his wretched and 
humble origin’
17
 and notes that even after sin the Gentiles concluded that ‘[man] is a 
rather outstanding figure’ on the basis of ‘the fact that he alone walks upright and 
raises his eyes to heaven’.
18
  
 The authority human beings are given by God over the other animals is perhaps 
the clearest indicator of their unique position within creation. Luther comments that in 
the command to Adam and Eve to have dominion ‘the rule is assigned to the most 
beautiful creature, who knows God and is the image of God, in whom the similitude 
of the divine nature shines forth through his enlightened reason, through his justice 
and his wisdom’.
19
 He emphasizes that the exercise of this rule is command, rather 
than mere permission
20
 and believes in his glorious unfallen state Adam could 
command lions ‘as we give a command to a trained dog’.
21
 If there had been no fall 
Adam and his family would have gathered to praise and laud God ‘for the dominion 
over all the creatures on the earth which had been given to mankind’
22
 and the 
restoration of God’s image in humanity will bring an enhanced dominion: ‘all the 
other creatures will be under our rule to a greater degree than they were in Adam’s 
Paradise’.
23
 
 When we look at other statements Luther makes in relation to human dominion 
over other animals, it is becomes evident that this is one area  
                                                 
15
 LW 1.68. For a discussion of the origin of the idea of human beings as a microcosm, see Paul 
Santmire, The Travail of Nature: The Ambiguous Ecological Promise of Christian Theology 
(Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1985), 81–2. Elsewhere Luther notes that God only breathed a living soul 
into Adam (1.85–92), that only human beings will leave animal and enter spiritual life (1.65), that only 
human beings know their Creator (1.67), and that humans alone were created for eternal life (22.30). 
16 LW 1.45–6. 
17
 LW 1.46. 
18
 LW 1.85. He is critical of this argument later in his Genesis commentary (LW 1.124–5), as discussed 
below. 
19 LW 1.66. 
20
 LW 1.66. 
21
 LW 1.64. 
22
 LW 1.105. 
23 LW 1.65. 
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where there are difficulties in coherence and consistency in his account. The first 
question concerns the purpose of dominion. Luther frankly admits that this is unclear 
before the fall. Adam would not have used other animals for food, did not lack 
clothing or money, and neither he nor his descendents would have been greedy. 
Therefore they would have made use of the other creatures ‘only for the admiration of 
God and for a holy joy which is unknown to us in this corrupt state of nature’.
24
 Here 
is an image of harmony between human and non-human animal life significantly at 
odds with the vivid language of authoritative rule — ‘Adam and Eve knew God and 
all the creatures and, as it were, were completely engulfed by the goodness and justice 
of God’
25
 — the other animals enable human worship and joy in God’s creation, and 
the authority human beings have from God to order them about seems purposeless.  
 If before sin, the purpose of the dominion granted to Adam and Eve is unclear, 
after sin its existence is the question. Adam’s extraordinary capabilities making him 
superior in every respect are left behind in the garden. In commentary on Genesis 
1:26, Luther observes that after sin, Adam can no longer command the other animals 
by his word, and what we achieve in life ‘is brought about not by the dominion which 
Adam had but through industry and skill’, leaving us only with a ‘bare title’ of 
dominion almost entirely without substance.
26
 In discussing Genesis 6:17, God’s 
words ‘I will bring a flood’, Luther adds weight to this idea that dominion has been 
lost: the destruction of other animals might seem unfair to them, but it represents part 
of the punishment of humans to lose their dominion over other animals too.
27
 In 
Luther’s commentary on Genesis chapter 7, however, it seems that he does not mean 
this punishment of loss of dominion to apply to the occupants of the ark: ‘Even 
though the greater part of the world perishes, man nevertheless remains lord of the 
creatures’ albeit over fewer creatures than there were previously.
28
 And when he 
comes to treat Genesis 9:2 ‘the fear of you shall be upon every beast’ Luther suggests 
that human dominion has been increased and changed in character in comparison with 
that granted to Adam: ‘until now the animals did not have to die in order to provide 
                                                 
24 LW 1.71. 
25
 LW 1.67. 
26
 LW 1.67. 
27
 LW 2.70. 
28 LW 2.100. 
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food for man, but man was a gentle master of the beasts rather than their slayer or 
consumer’ but now ‘the animals are subjected to man as to a tyrant who has absolute 
power over life and 
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death’.
29
 Luther makes a point of noting that this was an unnecessary innovation on 
God’s part: the permission to eat animals is given at a time when there were only a 
few human beings in the midst of the superabundance of the world — he does not 
reckon with a scarcity of vegetation after the flood. This is, then, a special indication 
from God of God’s favorable inclination and friendliness towards humanity.
30
 Luther 
goes further in seeing in this passage the origin and justification for the history of 
animal husbandry and consumption: the words ‘establish the butcher shop’ and ‘God 
sets Himself up as a butcher’.
31
 For Adam ‘it would have been an abomination to kill 
a little bird for food’, under this new regime ‘the dominion of man is increased, and 
the dumb animals are made subject to man for the purpose of serving him even to the 
extent of dying’.
32
 Luther judges that God did not lie in promising human beings 
dominion over the earth: ‘In the Flood this is taken away, not forever but for a time; 
and even then it is not taken away entirely.’
33
 
 This vision of God’s blessing of enhanced dominion over other animals is hard 
to square with Luther’s lament over the glories that were lost in the fall and his 
affirmation of a future restoration of the image of God when ‘all the other creatures 
will be under our rule to a greater degree than they were in Adam’s Paradise’.
34
 This 
promised restoration seems preempted by God’s response to Noah. This is the height 
of Luther’s anthropocentrism, and Gunton’s claim about Luther’s lack of interest in 
the ‘non-personal’ world for its own sake is entirely apt here.
35
 Luther is struck at one 
                                                 
29
 LW 2.132. Luther does not believe, however, that there are no limits to the exercise of this new 
dominion: animals can only be killed for sacrifice or food so ‘wanton and irreverent killing is 
forbidden’ (LW 2.139). He also suggests that human beings would be better off if consumption of meat 
had never been introduced (LW 1.36). 
30
 LW 2.133. 
31
 LW 2.133. 
32
 LW 2.133. 
33 LW 2.100. 
34
 LW 1.65. 
35
 Scott Ickert agrees that Luther ‘was not interested in animals per se as a theological topic’ ( 'Luther 
and Animals: Subject to Adam's Fall?', in Animals on the Agenda: Questions About Animals for 
Theology and Ethics, Andrew Linzey, and Dorothy Yamamoto (eds.) (London: SCM Press, 1998), 90. 
 7
point by the pedagogical value of stressing the loss of dominion as part of the plight 
of being heirs to Adam’s sin, and at another by the value of emphasizing God’s 
graciousness in realizing the dominion promised despite human disobedience in Eden 
and before the flood. In both cases, there is no recognition that God’s relationship 
with others of God’s creatures could be of significant independent concern. 
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 Luther’s uncertainty about the role of dominion is mirrored by instability in 
other parts of his account of human superiority over other animals. The role of reason 
and philosophy in providing either insight into human superiority or a differentiating 
feature between humans and other animals is a significant case in point here. While, 
as cited above, at times he seems impressed by the way the erect posture of human 
beings confirms their divinely ordained dominance,
36
 elsewhere he criticizes the use 
philosophers make of this argument, and argues that only Scripture can show the 
superiority of the human.
37
 Whereas philosophy defines a human being as a rational 
animal, ‘a theologian discusses man as a sinner’.
38
 A similar inconsistency pertains to 
his consideration of reason as a distinguishing mark between humans and other 
animals. He often depends on this in his discussion,
39
 even construing reason as ‘a 
kind of god’ creating dominion and differentiating between humans and other 
animals.
40
 Yet elsewhere, his critique of dependence on reason is famously strong:  in 
his last sermon in Wittenberg in 1546 he instructs his congregation to ‘hold reason in 
check and do not follow her beautiful cogitations. Throw dirt in her face and make her 
ugly. Reason is and should be drowned in baptism’.
41
 Luther therefore understands 
the philosophers he cites as valuing reason as a unique and supremely valuable human 
accomplishment, reliably distinguishing between humans and other animals, but in his 
own scheme this identification is ambivalent, claiming too much for itself in a 
                                                 
36 LW 1.46, 1.85.  
37
 LW 1.124–5. 
38
 LW 12.310. Elsewhere he asks who dares argue that the philosophical definition is true in theology 
(LW 13.125). 
39 E.g. ‘since man has understanding’ even four-year-old boys can rule much stronger creatures (LW 
12.209); ‘a man by reason tames a wild horse and an enormous lion’ (LW 15.125); the ‘rational 
sacrifice’ called for by Paul in Rom. 12.1 means one that is human, rather than animal (LW 36.145). 
40
 LW 34.137. 
41 LW 51.376–7. 
 8
prideful sense and often tending to lead the faithful astray.
42
 At the least, we should 
recognize that reason cannot function in his theological system in the same way as it 
does in the philosophical schemes to which he refers, thus opening up the question of 
the appropriate basis for distinguishing between humans and other animals in a 
theological framework. 
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 A further area of uncertainty in Luther concerning non-human animals is 
whether they have any part in the world to come. For the most part Luther seems clear 
that only human beings participate in eternity, judging through most of his 
commentary on Genesis that this is the chief difference between humans and other 
animals. At one point, he even pictures a rapture in which the saved are carried 
heavenward while everything on earth perishes in ashes.
43
 On occasion, however, he 
seems to picture other aspects to eternal life: in his commentary on 1 Cor. 15 he 
envisions playing in our spiritual bodies with the sun, moon and ‘all the other 
creatures’
44
 and looks forward to the time when a new essence comes into being ‘not 
only in us human beings but also in all other creatures’.
45
 In commentary on Psalm 8 
Luther asserts that there will be ‘a broad and beautiful heaven and a joyful earth, 
much more beautiful and joyful than Paradise was’
46
 and a passage in the Table Talk 
affirms that in the future life the earth will be adorned with trees.
47
 Elsewhere in the 
Table Talk Luther is reported to have answered in the affirmative when asked if his 
dog Tölpel would be in heaven: ‘Certainly…Peter said that the last day would be the 
restitution of all things. God will create a new heaven and a new earth and new 
Tölpels with hide of gold and silver’.
48
 Again, here, Luther is clear at points that 
                                                 
42 Whether Luther is right to see in Plato or Aristotle a discontinuity between the human and non-
human on the basis of reason is a different question. For an engaging exploration of this question, see 
Catherine Osborne, Dumb Beasts and Dead Philosophers: Humanity and the Humane in Ancient 
Philosophy and Literature (Oxford: Clarendon, 2007). 
43 LW 28.201. 
44
 LW 28.194. 
45
 LW 28.194. 
46
 LW 12.121. 
47 LW 54.41, no. 305. 
48
 D. Martin Luthers Werke: Kritische Gesamtausgabe, Tischreden, 6 vols (Weimar: Hermann Bölhaus 
Nachfolger, 1912–21), no. 1150, translated by Roland Bainton in ‘Luther on Birds, Dogs and Babies: 
Gleanings From the “Table Talk”’ in Luther Today, Martin Luther Lectures, Vol. 1, Roland H. 
Bainton, Warren A. Quanbeck, and E. Gordon Rupp (Decorah, Iowa: Luther College Press, 1957), 9. 
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human and non-human creatures belong in different categories in relation to eternal 
life, but also seems drawn to a vision of a renewed and restored earth with room for 
non-human creatures. 
 We cannot leave consideration of the aspects of Luther’s thought where he 
stresses the superiority of the human without noting the many occasions where he 
uses animal characteristics as insults to his enemies. While his expostulation ‘Listen 
now, you pig, dog, or fanatic, whatever kind of unreasonable ass you are…go back to 
your pigpen and your filth’!
49
 is particularly memorable, it is far from unique,
50
 and in 
his commentary on  
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Deuteronomy Luther refers extensively to the bestiary tradition associating particular 
animals with various vices.
51
 These are balanced by more favourable comparisons of 
humans with animals, as we shall see in the next section, but show that rhetorically 
Luther had no compunction about belittling comparisons with non-human animals in 
order to make vivid characterizations of those he criticized. 
2. Human commonality with and compassion for other animals 
In Luther’s commentary on Genesis, alongside the radical anthropocentrism we have 
seen above, it is striking to find Luther repeatedly recognizing deep similarities 
between human beings and other animals. Human beings share the life of land 
animals: they were created on the same day and had a ‘common table’ in the herbs 
and fruit of trees.
52
 Adam’s physical life was meant to be similar to ‘that of the other 
beasts’: ‘Just as the beasts have need of food, drink, and rest to refresh their bodies, so 
Adam, even in his innocence, would make use of them.’
53
 Human beings ‘increased 
                                                                                                                                            
Bainton notes several other passages in the Tischreden  where Luther is admiring of dogs, including no. 
869 and 2849a.  
49
 Luther, ‘That these words of Christ, “This is my body”, etc., still stand firm against the fanatics’ (LW 
37.68). 
50
 Of the many examples that could be chosen here, Luther claims that men become ‘brutes and beasts’ 
through their contempt of sound doctrine (LW 1.336), that antinomian opponents ‘become apes’ (LW 
5.309), that Epicureans live the life of an animal (LW. 7.117), that some people live like sows, others 
like wolves (LW 30.181) and that some parents are ‘despicable hogs and venomous beasts, devouring 
their own young’ (LW 46.210). 
51
 LW 9.136. 
52
 LW 1.36. 
53 LW 1.57. 
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and multiplied in the same manner as other beasts’ — Luther comments that the 
semen ‘congeals in the womb and is given form in an identical manner’ and 
concludes with no apparent concern for the impact of the comparison that ‘Here there 
is no difference between a pregnant cow and a woman with child’.
54
 A little later he 
delves further into the common physiology humans share with other animals in 
commentary on God’s breathing life into Adam in Genesis 2:7: 
If you consider the animal life about which Moses is speaking here, there is no 
difference between man and the donkey. Animal life has need of food and 
drink; it has need of sleep and rest; their bodies are fed in like manner by food 
and drink, and they grow; and through hunger they become faint and perish. 
The stomach receives the food, and when the food has been digested, passes it 
on to the liver, which produces  
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blood, by which all the limbs are given fresh strength. In this regard there is no 
difference between man and beast.
55
 
The beasts ‘greatly resemble’ human beings: ‘They dwell together; they are fed 
together; they eat together; they receive their nourishment from the same materials; 
they sleep and rest among us. Therefore if you take into account their way of life, 
their food, and their support, the similarity is great.’
56
 As regards our physical life ‘we 
drink, we eat, we procreate, and we are born just like the rest of the animals’
57
 and 
after the expulsion from Eden we share the place of the other animals as well as their 
food.
58
 At the flood, there was a common sorrow between Noah and the beasts and 
after the flood the covenant God makes is with Noah, his family, and all the other 
animals.
59
 These texts provide strong evidence that Luther considered there to be 
much in common between human beings and other animals. 
 To say that Luther recognizes human-non-human continuity is not to say that he 
values it. It is striking that almost all of the passages cited above discussing this 
commonality do so with the rhetorical purpose of highlighting the distinctiveness of 
                                                 
54
 LW 1.83. 
55 LW 1.85. 
56
 LW 1.56. 
57
 LW 1.121. 
58
 LW 1.230. 
59 LW 2.106; 2.143–4. 
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human beings despite these similarities, a distinctiveness often appreciable only 
through the revelation provided in Scripture. Luther’s mode of reasoning is that the 
human experience of living alongside other creatures and comparing ourselves to 
them gives us a strong sense of our animality, but that this observation of what we 
have in common with other animals provokes the anxiety that we may be no more 
than cows, donkeys or other beasts. The structure of his depends on this negative 
interpretation of continuity: if intimations of our animality did not make us anxious, 
we would not be in need of the good news proclaimed in Genesis that we have a 
different status in the world from those other creatures to which we seem so similar.
60
 
Luther’s con- 
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cern about the distinctiveness of the human in the face of observations to the contrary 
arising from knowledge of the natural world shows that he had wrestled with the issue 
more than two centuries before the work of Darwin provoked further reflection on it 
and shows anxiety about continuity between human and non-human animals is not 
dependent on a belief in an evolutionary lineage of descent connecting them. 
 In other writings Luther seems to be much less anxious about affirmations 
concerning the commonality between human beings and others of God’s creatures. 
The most obvious place in which this different attitude is evident is in his sacramental 
theology, where he develops an understanding of God’s presence throughout creation. 
This is most poetically expressed in a 1527 tract where he insists that the power of 
God ‘must be essentially present [Wesentlich und gegenwertig] at all places, even in 
the tiniest tree leaf’.
61
 Luther describes this essential presence in way that is at once 
lyrical and thoroughgoing: 
[God] must be present in every single creature in its innermost and outermost 
being, on all sides, through and through, below and above, before and behind, 
so that nothing can be more truly present and within all creatures than God 
himself with his power. For it is him that makes the skin and it is he who makes 
                                                 
60
 Therefore Rasumussen is wrong to say that Luther’s recognition of what humans have in common 
with other animals ‘does not bother Luther one whit’ (L. L. Rasmussen, ‘Luther and a Gospel of 
Earth’, Union Seminary Quarterly Review 51:1-2 (1997), 4). Luther is bothered by the thought that we 
might be no more than animals, and depends on his readers sharing this view in order to present them 
with the good news he finds in Genesis that humans have a different origin and destiny. 
61 LW 37.57. 
 12
the bones; it is he who makes the hair on the skin and it is he who makes the 
marrow in the bones; it is he who makes every bit of the hair, it is he who 
makes every bit of the marrow. Indeed, he must make everything, both the parts 
and the whole.
62
 
Luther confesses that holding together the idea that God is present everywhere in 
creation but not circumscribed by it is ‘infinitely incomprehensible’, but multiplies 
images of the intimacy of God’s relationship to creation: ‘the Divine Majesty is so 
small as to be present in essence in a kernel, on a kernel, above a kernel, throughout a 
kernel, inside and outside — and, even though it is one single Majesty, can 
nevertheless by completely and entirely present in every individual thing, countless in 
number though they be’.
63
 Luther is then faced with the question of how to speak of 
God’s unique presence in Christ. His answer is that in relation to all creatures, we can  
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say “There is God, or God is in it” whereas only in relation to Christ can we say “This 
is God himself”.
64
 This fundamental contrast between Christ and creatures is 
reiterated in Luther’s 1528 ‘Confession concerning Christ’s supper’: Christ is ‘beyond 
and above all creatures’; ‘Beyond the creatures there is only God’.
65
 Elsewhere he 
repeats the assertion that all animals, including human beings, derive their life from 
God, and recognizes that Hebrew word for soul denotes all animal life that lives and 
breathes.
66
 He also maintains that even the mouse is a ‘divine creature’, beautiful in 
form, with ‘such pretty feet and such delicate hair’ that it must have been created with 
                                                 
62 LW 37.58. 
63
 LW 37.59. 
64
 LW 37.59. In the lectures on Genesis Luther states that ‘the face of God shines forth in all His 
creatures’ (LW 6.173) and in commentary on Psalm 78 he portrays every creature as an utterance of 
God (LW 11.39). The theme of all creatures having their life in God is also present in Luther’s 
Christmas sermon on John 1.4: ‘everything that lives has life of him and through him and in him’ (LW 
52.53). In a passage in the Table Talk Luther laments that this would have been a more common 
recognition before the fall: ‘Oh, what thoughts man might have had about the fact that God is in all 
creatures, and so might have reflected on the power and the wisdom of God in even the smallest 
flowers!’ (LW 54.327). 
65
 LW 37.229. 
66
 LW 22.30, 22.37, 28.191. This broad vision of creatureliness also seems operative when Luther is 
discussing Romans 8: criticizing philosophical accounts that are inattentive to the final end of creation 
he comments ‘whoever searches into the essences and actions of creation rather than its groanings and 
expectations is without doubt a fool and a blind man, for he does not know that creatures are also a 
creation of God’ (LW 25.362). Andrew Linzey comments that this text seems to indicate a ‘non-
humanocentric’ perspective in Luther (Animal Theology (London: SCM Press, 1994), 189). 
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some plan in view.
67
 It seems, then, that when Luther is preoccupied with creaturely 
realities, he is inclined to see a significant division between human beings and other 
animals, whereas at those times when he enlarges his vision to creation in the context 
of its Creator, it is obvious to him that the fundamental categories are Creator and 
creatures.
68
 
 The intimacy of God’s relationship with all creation is also evident in God’s 
care for non-human animals. In commenting on the Genesis flood narrative, Luther 
notes that God remembers not just Noah, but the beasts too,
69
 when preaching on the 
opening of John’s Gospel, he notes the  
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importance of affirming that God is still working to sustain the whole of creation
70
 
and when lecturing on 1 Timothy he cites Psalm 36.6 ‘Man and beast Thou savest, O 
Lord’ and affirms that God is rightly called the ‘Saviour of all beasts’.
71
 When he 
comes to consider a later passage (1 Tim. 5.18) concerning not muzzling an ox when 
treading grain, he first calls the text ‘pure allegory’, citing Paul’s dismissive comment 
‘Is it for oxen that God is concerned?’, but he cannot quite rest with this conclusion, 
noting the Psalm 36 text again and insisting that God is concerned for all things.
72
 
 God’s concern for all creatures is reflected in Luther’s own views and practice. 
He pities the plight of oxen and flocks without pasture pictured by Joel,
73
 and stories 
from the Table Talk depict him playing with his puppy, Tölpel, using dogs as 
examples of concentration and faithfulness, remarking on the beautiful eyes of small 
birds, and wishing that they were aware of his good intentions towards them so that 
                                                 
67 LW 1.52. 
68
 Rassmussen thinks Luther has gone too far in his admiration for mice (Earth Community, Earth 
Ethics (Geneva: WCC Publications, 1996), 275 n.). Rasmussen also seems to overstate the significance 
of the passage cited concerning the kernel, arguing that it shows Luther to be engaged in ‘earth-bound 
theology’ that is ‘boldly pan-en-theistic’ (Earth Community, 273), and that Luther believes that ‘Trying 
to rise above nature is, for earthbound creatures like us, the essence of sin’ (‘Luther and a Gospel of 
Earth’, 3). It is clear even from the survey presented here that Luther often endorsed such an attempt to 
rise above nature on biblical grounds on terms very distant from panentheism. 
69 LW 2.106. 
70
 LW 22.28–9. 
71
 LW 28.326. 
72
 LW 28.348. 
73 LW 18.86. 
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they would not fly away.
74
 A few remarkable texts supplement these brief indications. 
The first is a jocular letter to he wrote to himself in 1534 on behalf of the birds in the 
Wittenberg Wood complaining at the traps his servant Wolfgang Sieberger has set for 
them, which begins 
To our good and kind Dr. Martin Luther, preacher in Wittenberg. We thrushes, 
blackbirds, linnets, goldfinches, along with other well-disposed birds who are 
spending their summer at Wittenberg, desire to let you know that we are told on 
good authority that your servant, Wolfgang Sieberger, out of the great hatred he 
bears to us, has brought some old rotten nets to set up a fowling-ground for 
finches, and not only for our dear friends and finches, but in order to deprive us 
of the liberty of flying in the air and picking up grains of corn, and also to make 
an attempt upon our lives, although we have not deserved such a punishment at 
his hands.
75
 
 
[top of page 54] 
 
While the letter is tongue-in-cheek and does not represent a considered position 
against the trapping of birds,
76
 it does show at the least attentiveness to them and 
empathy for their position. This attention to birds is also evident in a 1530 letter to 
George Spalatin, in which he is struck by the jackdaws at Coburg, and the similarity 
of their gathering to the diet he is on his way to attend: 
We sit here with great pleasure in [this] diet, as idle spectators and listeners. For 
in addition to the fact that that uniform and beautiful black color wonderfully 
refreshes us, seeing that these heroes are so magnificently dressed, the 
unanimity of all their voices, which are saturated with beautiful melodies, also 
delights us beyond measure…[Consequently] if something could be 
accomplished by wishing it, we would wish that they might be free of that 
defamatory name monedula [Latin for ‘jackdaw’] or rather from the accusation 
                                                 
74 LW 54.37 (no. 274); 54.175 (no. 2849b); 54.192 (no. 3223a). Luther also comments on the 
faithfulness of dogs in his lectures on Isaiah (LW 17.265). The Table Talk includes Luther’s reported 
approval of rather different behaviour of dogs: one who is accused by a priest of being a Lutheran after 
urinating in the holy water and another who defecated into the grave of the bishop of Halle (LW 54.421 
(no. 5418)). 
75
 Luther, The Letters of Martin Luther, ed. Margaret A. Currie (London: Macmillan & Co, 1908), 300 
(Letter no. 312). For information on Wolfgang Sieberger and his trapping, see LW 49.158 n. 
76
 See, for example, an equally jovial letter to Justas Jonas asking him to buy ‘whatever in that airy 
kingdom of our feathered friends is subject to the dominion of man’ (LW 50.94–5). 
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that they are thievish, and that they might be praised with names worthy of their 
dignity—that is, that they all together might be called ‘lancers’ or ‘spearmen’.
77
 
Luther was involved in a more immediate encounter with non-human animals when 
he tried hunting for two days in Wartburg in 1521. In another letter to Spalatin, he 
describes his ambivalence about his participation: ‘However great the pleasure may 
be from these things, the mystery, of pity and pain mixed into it is equally great’. He 
allegorizes the experience in seeing hunting as the work of the devil, ‘who hunts 
innocent little creatures with his ambushes and his dogs’. Yet this allegorizing does 
not make him disregard the actuality of the event: ‘By my efforts we had saved a little 
live rabbit. I had rolled it up into the sleeve of my cloak and left it alone for a little 
while. In the meantime the dogs found the poor rabbit and, biting through the cloak, 
broke its right hind leg and killed it by choking it.’
78
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In the letter Luther goes on to reflect on this as an illustration of the way ‘pope and 
Satan rage to destroy even the souls that have been saved’ but also confesses ‘I am 
sick of this kind of hunting’, stating a preference for a hunting creatures that could be 
allegorized as ‘wicked teachers’, such as bears, wolves, boars and foxes.
79
 Again, this 
text does not represent a considered judgement against hunting, but the allegorizing, 
as well as his sabotage of the hunt in attempting to save the rabbit, show his innate 
sympathy for the plight of the creatures being pursued and his inclination to protect 
them. 
 It is notable that even at the end of the hunting letter, Luther describes his 
comments as joking, making this a common thread in each of these letters in which he 
identifies and empathizes with the situation of non-human animals. The obvious way 
                                                 
77
 LW 49.292–5 (no. 207, April 24, 1530). Bainton notes that some doubt the authenticity of this letter 
because the original has been lost and there is a problem with the date, but judges that ‘the style is 
certainly echt’ (‘Luther on Birds’, 5). This attentiveness to animals is also evident in correspondence 
about his translation of the Old Testament: in 1522 he wrote to Spalatin for descriptions and 
classifications by species for various birds of prey, game animals and reptiles (LW 49.19).  
78
 LW 48.295. 
79
 Luther’s ambivalence about hunting is reflected in other writings: in his lectures on Genesis he is 
critical of the damage done by princes during hunts (LW 4.382), insists that the sole legitimate purpose 
for hunting is to provide food (LW 7.267) and uses the image of a hunted hind or stag for the tribe of 
Naphtali, escaping the hunters through the protection of God. The editors of Luther’s Works note that 
his commentary on Psalm 147 was a present for Hans Löser in gratitude for his hospitality during a 
hunting trip in which Luther expounded the psalm in preference to hunting. 
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of reading this self-confessed lack of seriousness when attending to birds and animals 
is that Luther was not seriously interested or concerned for them, instead using them 
as merely occasions for humour, or as sources for theological allegory. Against this 
interpretation, however, we must count the real sympathy evident in Luther’s concern 
for the other innocent creatures hunted, and the attentiveness with which he observes 
and empathizes with them.
80
 This points to another explanation of his dismissal of his 
writings on animals as jovial: that he is aware that this is an eccentric interest which 
may not be well understood by Spalatin or other friends with whom he corresponds. If 
so, it may not be over-stating the case to suggest that the humour in these letters 
serves as a signal of a tension Luther experiences between his sympathy for the 
animals he observes and general societal attitudes to them, or even that the humour is 
an indicator of an unresolved tension between his own relationships with animals and 
his theological positioning of them. Given that he is elsewhere committed to the view 
that animals are provided by God merely for human use, it must seem odd to him to 
care that Wittenberg birds are being trapped in nets, or  
 
[top of page 56] 
 
majestic jackdaws are disrespected as thieves, or that a rabbit is caught by hounds.
81
 
 One final aspect indication of Luther’s good opinion of animals is the many 
other examples in his writing where he holds them up as good examples to be 
emulated by people. In commentary on Luke 1.49 — where there is no obvious 
animal referent — Luther is moved to comment 
A bird pipes its lay and is happy in the gifts it has; nor does it murmur because 
it lacks the gift of speech. A dog frisks gayly about and is content, even though 
he is without the gift of reason. All animals live in contentment and serve God, 
loving and praising Him. Only the evil, villainous eye of man is never 
                                                 
80 This is further supported by Bainton’s observation that in his struggles with depression, Luther found 
it helpful to watch birds and babies who took life blithely (‘Luther's Struggle for Faith’, Church 
History 17:3 (1948), 201). 
81
 Paul Santmire and John Cobb argue that a key problematic in Luther’s theology of nature is the need 
he saw to shut his eyes to the world around in order to listen to God (H. Paul Santmire, and John B. 
Cobb Jr., 'The World of Nature According to the Protestant Tradition', in The Oxford Handbook of 
Religion and Ecology, Roger S. Gottlieb (ed.) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 116–8).  The 
attention to animals detailed here shows clearly that Luther was not consistent in this methodology, 
which perhaps is another reason for his lack of ease with the affection for nature he reports. 
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satisfied.
82
 
This theme of animals praising God is repeated in signing off one of his letters from 
Coburg ‘In the land of the birds that sing sweetly in the branches and praise God with 
all their power night and day’.
83
 Elsewhere he compares the sexual restraint of non-
human animals favourably with human traits,
84
 considers it shameful that some 
parents do not care adequately for their children when animals do this by nature
85
 and 
— in his earliest sermon — that animals keep the law of loving their neighbour while 
human beings do not.
86
 In the ‘The Bondage of the Will’ he cites Psalm 73.22 ‘I am 
become a beast before thee’ as a positive image of the human will living in 
faithfulness to God, in contrast with being ridden by Satan.
87
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 The most striking positive image of a non-human animal in Luther’s writings, 
however, is a Christological one. In a sermon on Jesus’ lament over Jerusalem (Mt. 
23.34–9), he explores in detail the comparison with a hen: 
Let us observe how a natural mother-hen acts. There is hardly an animal that 
takes care of its offspring so meticulously. It changes its natural voice turning it 
into a lamenting, mourning one; it searches, scratches for food and lures the 
chick to eat. When the mother-hen finds something, she does not eat it, but 
leaves it for the chicks; she fights seriously and calls her chicks away from the 
hawk; she spreads out her wings willingly and lets the chicks climb under her 
and all over her, for she is truly fond of them—it is, indeed, an excellent, lovely 
symbol. Similarly, Christ has taken unto himself a pitiful voice, has lamented 
for us and has preached repentance, has indicated from his heart to everyone his 
sin and misery. He scratches in the Scripture, lures us into it, and permits us to 
eat; he spreads his wings with his righteousness, merit, and grace over us and 
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 LW 21.320. 
83
 LW 48.236. 
84 LW 1.116, 5.289. 
85
 LW 6.17, 45.353. 
86
 LW 51.10–11. 
87
 LW 33.65–6. For further discussion of this image, see Marjorie O'Rourke Boyle, ‘Luther’s Rider-
Gods: From the Steppe to the Tower’, Journal of Religious History 13:3 (1985), 260–82. Luther also 
pictures small flowers, leaves or birds as preaching God’s forgiveness, but this tends towards reading 
creation as a message from God for human beings, rather than seeing creation in its own right (LW 
21.126). Bainton notes that, unlike Melanchthon, Luther ‘restricted himself to the animals before his 
eyes’ for such illustrations (‘Luther on Birds’, 4). 
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takes us under himself in a friendly manner, warms us with his natural heat, i.e., 
with his Holy Ghost who comes solely through him, and in the air fights for us 
against the devil.
88
 
This comparison is more than allegorical: the passage speaks of careful observation of 
hens with their chicks, and Luther sees in their attentive maternal care nothing short 
of an image of Christ, rooted in Christ’s self-identification with a mother hen.
89
 
3. Fences under strain: tensions in Luther’s account of animals 
In the survey I have provided of Luther’s discussion of animals, I have pointed to 
several points at which his discussion seems under strain. In his commentary on 
Genesis, he repeatedly emphasizes that observation of the world shows us how much 
humans are like other animals, but that Scripture reveals that humans have a different 
origin and destiny. This is not consistently rendered, however, with occasional 
references to  
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natural signs of the superiority of humans despite critique elsewhere of philosophical 
affirmations of human dignity. Luther’s discussion of reason is particularly fraught: 
he sometimes accepts the philosophical definition of human beings as rational 
animals, but his emphasis on sinfulness as the fundamental element in a theological 
anthropology challenges this, and his tirades against reason make him an unlikely 
advocate for rationality as a marker of unique human superiority. Dominion seems a 
more straightforward category for Luther to distinguish human and non-human 
theologically, but he is unclear about its purpose before the fall, and about whether to 
emphasize the loss of dominion as punishment for sin or God’s graceful extension of 
it after the flood. Luther makes clear and uncompromising anthropocentric statements 
affirming that God made creation to provide for human beings, but his attentiveness 
and concern for the animals with which he came into contact speak of a concern for 
them for their own sake, in line with the affirmation in his sacramental theology of the 
intimacy of God’s presence in all creatures. Luther is self-contradictory about the role 
                                                 
88
 LW 52.97–8. 
89
 We should also note in this context Luther’s reported appreciation of Aesop: two comments in his 
Table Talk, recorded by different visitors to his table, record his appreciation of Aesop’s Fables as 
superior to Jerome (LW 54.72) and alongside Cato second only to the Bible (LW 54.210). 
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of non-human creatures in eternal life, and I have suggested that his identification of 
reports of his observation and care of animals as humorous, may in itself indicate his 
own difficulty in seeing how to fit his obvious empathy with non-human animals with 
his broader theological commitments.
90
 
 At one key point the tension I have argued is implicit in Luther thinking about 
the relationship between humans and other animals becomes explicit. In commentary 
on Genesis 2.7, he delivers his judgement that to say that human beings are both the 
image of God and have a life in common with the animals is nonsensical: ‘The 
statement that though man is created according to the similitude of God, he does not 
differ from cattle in his animal life is clearly contradictory, or, as they call it in the 
schools, “a contradiction in the predicate”.’
91
 Luther is not clear about the nature of 
the contradiction here, but presumably his concern is that if we believe that human 
beings are both like God and like cattle, this suggests the unacceptable conclusion that 
God is like cattle. As we have seen, in the passage discussed at the  
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end of the previous section, Luther had no reservation in accepting the conclusion that 
Jesus is like a mother hen, but here he is not prepared to countenance a divine-animal 
resemblance.  Nor, unsurprisingly, is he content to rest with the judgement that 
Scripture is contradictory. Instead, he sees this apparent contradiction between human 
as both animal and imaging God as pointing beyond itself: ‘by a very beautiful 
allegory, or rather by an anagoge, Moses wanted to intimate dimly that God was to 
become incarnate’.
92
 Luther is saying that the text here is anagogical — containing a 
spiritual truth anticipating the future revelation of Christ. Within the interpretative 
frame of the Genesis, it does not make sense to say both that humans are animals and 
that they are images of God: the assertions are contradictory. The tension caused by 
the contradiction can only be resolved by recognizing it to be an intimation of 
                                                 
90 The lack of fit between different elements has been noted by Santmire, who contrasts the 
‘anthropocentric-soteriological’ centre to Luther and Calvin’s thought with a ‘theocentric-ecological’ 
circumference and maintains that the tension between the two was never resolved (Travail of Nature, 
131–2). Rasmussen cites Santmire’s view in his critique of Luther (‘Luther and a Gospel of Earth, 22–
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 LW 1.87. 
92 LW 1.87. 
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something beyond itself, signifying the need for resolution in a different context, in 
this case the context of the entire Christian canon. 
 My proposal for what we should make of Luther’s discussion of non-animals 
takes his recommendation here as a model. As I have noted, when we survey the 
whole of Luther’s thinking about animals, we encounter a broad range of 
perspectives, from those that are straightforwardly anthropocentric, in continuity with 
the mainstream of the tradition he inherited, to those that verge on pantheistic as he 
meditates on God’s intimate presence in creation. This may be in part because non-
human animals are rarely the focus of his discussion, and when they are, he 
apparently feels the need to excuse his idiosyncrasy as a joke. To resolve the tension 
created by taking stock of the multiplicity of Luther’s perspectives on animals I have 
collected in this chapter, we could consider arguments to accept one trajectory or 
another from it as normative: we could judge that his anthropocentric statements 
should be used to interpret all other aspects of his thought, or that it is appropriate to 
begin with his minute exploration of God’s presence in a tiny seed and to interpret all 
else taking this as the norm.
93
 To proceed in this way would be, in terms of the 
contradiction we have just considered, to opt for the view either that human beings are 
the image of God, or that they are animals, and reject the alternative. This would no 
doubt have the virtue of clarity and simplicity, but it would miss half of what the text 
was telling us about the relationships between God, humanity and other animals, 
which — apart from fidelity to Scripture — was  
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presumably what held Luther back from doing so. I suggest that we will be better 
interpreters of Luther in relation to animals if we resist the desire to resolve the 
tensions evident in the many ways in which he talks about animals, and instead 
interpret these tensions anagogically: as pointing beyond themselves, as intimating the 
need for resolution in a different context than the one in which he was working, and 
as showing that the animals who appear so frequently in his writing cannot be 
contained behind the fences he sometimes held them behind.  
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 Ickert seems close to this latter track in concluding that for Luther God-given dominion means 
‘human beings are given an unequivocal responsibility to care for and protect the non-human creation’ 
(‘Luther and Animals’, 98). 
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 What then would be the context in which Luther’s insights could find a 
resolution beyond themselves? My favourite illustration of the change of perspective 
required is from a parable from the Jewish philosopher and theologian Moses 
Maimonides. He pictures an individual in a city who believes that the final end of the 
ruler of the city is to keep the individual’s house safe from robbers. Maimonides 
comments that this is true from a certain point of view, since the house is kept safe 
because of the ruler’s action.
94
 Whenever Luther speaks of God’s provision of other 
creatures for the benefit of human beings, he is always seeking to assure his audience 
of God’s grace towards humanity: to set out the good news that, despite appearances 
at times, in God’s ongoing activity of creation God is concerned to establish a place 
for human beings to live and thrive.
95
 Within the terms of Maimonides’s parable, 
Luther is providing assurance that the ruler is indeed ensuring the safety of the house. 
If we accept the insight of the parable that this may not be a complete account of the 
purposes of the ruler — that the ruler might also be concerned with the safety of the 
other houses in the city — we can ask whether within the generous economy of God’s 
creative grace, God might be concerned in a similar way for parts of creation other 
than the human. Within this broader context, we could do justice both to Luther’s 
bold pronouncements of God’s graciousness towards humanity, and to his intimations 
that other forms of creaturely life, such as birds and rabbits and dogs, might also have 
their own place in God’s purposes. Just as Luther interprets Genesis anagogically, as 
containing a tension that points beyond itself to the incarnation, this is a proposal to 
interpret Luther’s thought on animals as an anagoge, intimating the need for a wider 
perspective as to God’s dealings with human and non-human animals. 
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 Moses Maimonides, The Guide of the Perplexed, trans. Shlomo Pines (Chicago: University of 
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95
 Walter Brueggemann argues that the dating of Genesis to the exilic period means that the creation 
narratives themselves were attempting a similar task of reassuring the Israelites that despite 
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